The inability of the G20 finance ministers to agree on a joint statement last week points to an important reality about multilateralism. When great powers are at peace with each other, multilateralism has reasonable chances of success; but when they are at each other’s throats, the room for global cooperation shrinks. Multilateralism, then, is not an activity independent of power politics. The outcome of the gathering of the G20 foreign ministers this week is unlikely to be any different from what we have seen with the finance ministers. The shadow of the great power rivalry on the G20 is only likely to darken in the days ahead as China and Russia consolidate their “alliance without limits” and Washington rallies the collective West to stand up against Moscow and Beijing.
To be functional, multilateral institutions like the G20, United Nations and World Trade Organisation need at least a minimal understanding among the major powers on the global rules of the road. Such an understanding was not obtained during the Cold War except in a few areas like nuclear arms control. Although the UN was set up after the Second World War with the expectation that the great powers would work together, the world saw the allies turn adversaries and sharply divide the world into competing economic and military blocs. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, curtains fell on the prolonged East-West Cold War. It opened doors for an expansive phase of multilateralism for nearly a quarter of a century — whether it was great power cooperation at the UN or in the creation of the WTO.
When the financial crisis of 2008 broke out, the Bush administration rallied the top 20 economies of the world to stabilise the global economy. That world of shared interests among the top nations no longer exists. It is no surprise, then, that consensus on key issues eludes the G20 today.
The simmering political conflict between Russia and the West boiled over into a hot war in the heart of Europe last year. There is a real chance that Washington and Beijing might get into military blows over Taiwan. The rising geopolitical conflict is naturally mirrored in the economic domain. The post-Cold War era saw extensive economic engagement between the US and Europe on the one hand and China and Russia on the other. Differences in ideology and character of the political system did not matter as economic interdependence was beneficial to all.
The last few years have seen diminishing faith in the logic of globalisation as well as active weaponisation of interdependence in the pursuit of their particular national objectives. This has seen efforts by the US and China to reduce their current massive economic exposure to the other. The new economic conflict has also enveloped emerging technologies — especially the digital domain that promises to reshape the global economy as well as restructure the nature of military power in the international system.
This is not a good moment, then, for multilateralism. As it steers the G20 amidst the renewed rivalry between the major powers, India must temper its expectations from the G20. There is little possibility that the current military, political and economic tensions between the major powers can be mitigated any time soon. Reducing the inevitable negative impact of the renewed great power conflict on the G20 in itself will be a diplomatic achievement for India.
Meanwhile, India’s ambition to represent the interests of the Global South at the G20 does not mean Delhi’s multilateral diplomacy can stand apart from the great power conflict. India is very much part of the renewed great power rivalry. Delhi’s troubled relationship with Beijing is one of the key strands in contemporary geopolitics. This is not just about Beijing’s military assertiveness, which has led to the repeated breakdown of peace and tranquillity on India’s long and disputed border with China over the last decade. It is also about deep differences between Delhi and Beijing on multilateral issues.
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In the past, it was conventional wisdom that Delhi and Beijing could work together in the multilateral domain despite their bilateral problems on the border. That enthusiasm in Delhi has had to be curbed in recent years. China has blocked India’s efforts to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Beijing does not support Delhi’s quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. There is also growing friction in a range of new areas. Consider, for example, India’s rejection of China’s Belt and Road Initiative when it was unveiled in 2017. Recall too Delhi’s move in 2019 to walk out of the Asia-wide trade liberalisation agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
The decision was based on the judgement that Delhi can’t afford to become a part of a China-dominated regional economic bloc. China’s latest initiatives on global security and development have not resonated well in Delhi either.
India also had to fend off Beijing’s push, at the behest of Pakistan, to put the Kashmir question back on the active agenda of the UNSC in 2019, following Delhi’s constitutional changes to the status of Kashmir in the Indian union. Yet, India continues to sit somewhat uncomfortably with China in various forums like the RIC (Russia-India-China), BRICS (along with Brazil and South Africa), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It is also a member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
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Amidst mounting challenges from China, India has deepened bilateral strategic ties with the US and Europe. Delhi has also revived the Quad forum with Australia, Japan and the US.
The Quad is now one of India’s premier multilateral forums. But India does not or can’t simply turn its back on China — whose growing economic and military weight makes it a powerful player in the international system. Nor can it ignore Russia, which has just reminded the world of its enormous capacity to disrupt the global order.
In the past, India seemed to focus on just one kind of multilateralism — the UN and the NAM. Delhi now participates in multiple kinds of multilateral institutions. The UN, which brings the world together, remains an important focus for India. A less universal coalition like the G20 is important for multilateralism but is also quite vulnerable to geopolitics. Managing that tension is the principal burden of India’s stewardship of the G20 this year.
Delhi also participates in groupings of “like-minded countries” such as the Quad in the pursuit of national and regional interests. India is also a regular invitee to the G7 forum of advanced industrial democracies. It is also actively trying to resuscitate its past coalition with the Global South. After years of unsuccessful attempts to mobilise the UN to counter cross-border terrorism, Delhi turned to the Financial Action Task Force to put some real pressure on Pakistan.
The diversity of India’s multilateralism reflects the structural imperatives of global politics. Delhi has no option but to try and cooperate with its adversaries to solve larger regional and global problems. At the same time, national interests demand that India wrestle with its rivals and collaborate with like-minded countries in the multilateral domain. The relative mix of cooperation and contestation depends on the context and the nature of the specific issue at hand.
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The writer is senior fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi and contributing editor on international affairs, The Indian Express
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